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Frances Antonovitz and Terry Roe*A MEASURE OF THE VALUE OF INFORMATION FOR THE COMPETITIVE
FIRM UNDER PRICE UNCERTAINTY
This paper addresses the problem of measuring the value of information
to an agent in an environment where the agent is risk averse and choices
are based on the utility of income and personal beliefs about the likelihood
of uncertain outcomes. If the agent’s beliefs about the likelihood of un-
certain outcomes are less consistent with realized outcomes than would be
the case of “more informed” beliefs, then it can be shown that the agent
would be willing to forego an amount of income to become more informed and
would experience an increase in utility. Empirical estimates of the value
of information are important for obtaining insights into issues
informationalefficiency of alternative market structures, ‘the




of resource use and the social profitability of information
private enterprise and public agencies.
The conceptual framework of the competitive firm under
supplied by
price uncertainty
has been developed by a number of authors including Sandmo (1971), Holthausen
(1979), and Pope (1978, 1980). In these models the producer is assumed to
formulate his subjective distribution based on information available at the
time output decisions are made. The value of information in this context
has been formulated using a Bayesian approach which provides the agent with
normative decision rules to determine whether additional information would
lead to an increase in expected utility. (Lindley, 1971; Anderson, Dillon,
and Hardacker, 1977; Winkler, 1972).-2-
Otherwise, the literature has given little emphasis to the question of
measuring the value of information to the competitivefirm under price un-
certainty. Furthermore, the empirical application of Bayes theorem to explain
the observed behavior of risk averse agents is fraught with major difficulties.
While estimates of the agentk prior distribution of uncertain events may be
obtained from observed choices, or in some cases solicited directLy, the
content of additional information, the process by which additional information
becomes available and whether the agent behaves as though the prior is updated
according to Bayes theorem raises major difficulties in applying the theorm
to estimating the value of information from observed behavior of agents.
Three approaches to estimating the value of informationare presented in
this paper which avoids these difficulties,
knowledge of the agents utility function is
easier to use in empirical application even
Bayesian procedure.
although, for two of the measures,
required. These approaches are
though they are similar to the
The conceptual framework is stated in the next section. Then, procedures
for measuring the value of information to a risk averse agent arederived,
and the usefulness of these
sample problem is presented
I.
measures in applied research is discussed. A
in the appendix to demonstrate the procedure.
THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The competitive firm under price uncertainty will be described in a
Bernoullian framework where the agent’s utility function is a concave,
continuous, and differentiable function of profits. Consider the primal-
dual Lagrangean function
L* = EU (IT*) - EU(IT) (1)-3-
where EU(r*) is the indirect expected utility function and EU(m) is the direct
expected utility function. Profit is
Tr = Pq - c(q) (2)
where P is stochastic output price, q is quantity, and C(q) is the cost function.
The indirect function is determined by solving for the optimal output quantity
as a function of only the parameters and substituting back into the direct
function. Hence, the indirect function is the maximum value of expected utility
expressed solely as a function of the parameters. More specifically equation
(1) is
L* = EU[Pq* - C04*)I- Eu[Pq - c(q)]. (3)
*
where q is the value that maximizes the direct utility of profit function,
Eu(l’r).The first order condition for a minimum is:
* .-
dL —= -E[U’(IT)(P - C’(q))] = O aq
(4)
and continuous.
order condition with no reference made
where U’(IT) = ~ and C’(q) is positive
Equation (4) is the general first
to the agent’s distribution of output price. To describe the different output
choices that occur when the agent’s distribution of output price is based on
different sets of information and to facilitate the derivation of various
measures of the value of information, four states of information will be
defined: the subjective, more informed, realized, and perfect states.
The Subjective State
The agent’s subjective distribution, denoted by f“(p), represents his
beliefs based on the information available at the time theoutput decision was made. The optimal quantity of output can be determined
by using equation (4) and taking the expectation with respect to f“(p). The
first order condition can be represented by
EOIU’(m)(P - C’(q))] = O. (5)
The agent’s optimal output choice found by solving equation (5) is a non-
stochasticvariable which will be represented by q“. However, prior to
the realization of output price, profit remains a stochastic variable:
o n = PqO - C(q”). (6)
The utility that the agent expects to obtain from producing q“ is EOU(nO).
Note that this expectation is based on his subjective distribution of
price.
Realized State
The quantity produced, q“, is sold at a realized price denoted by
Pr. However, because P is stochastic, the agent’s price expectation may not
equal pr. Profit is no longer a stochastic variable and will be denoted by
r IT = Prqo - C(q”).
That is, given the output decision made in the subjective state q“
realized price pr, realized profits,are given by ?Tr.
More Informed State
If the agent’s beliefs were based on more information than in
subjective state, the distribution based on this information would





Denote this more informed distribution by fm(p)i The optimal output choice,
denoted by qm, in the more informed state can be determined by equation (4)
with expectations taken with respect to the more informed distribution:
Em[U’(T)(P - C’(q))] = 0. (8)
Prior to realization of the output price, profit is a stochastic variable
represented by
m m ‘R = Pq - C(qm). (9)
The expected utility in the more informed state is E%(ITm).
Perfect State
The perfect state of information represents what the agent’s optimal
output decision would have been if he had known the actual output price pr
I/ at the time he made the output decision.— With pr known, the agent need only
maximize profits. In this instance, the primal-dual Lagrangean function is
J* = prq* - c(q*) - Prq +C(q),
and the first order condition is
aJ*
~= -p= +C’(q) = o.
Let the optimal output choice given,by equation (10) be denoted by qt
where profit is given by
(lo)
Tt = prqt - C(clt) . (11)-6-
11. The Value of Information
Three different measures of the value of informationwill be discussed.
The first is an ex-post measure of the value of information. This measure
is referred to as the value of perfect information. It is determined by
comparing the profit realized mr from the choice q“ in the subjective state
with the profit mt in the perfect state. The other two measures that will
be discussed are ex-ante measures. In
is not assumed to be known, but rather
with information embodied in fO(P) are
these cases, the actual output price
decisions made in the subject state
compared with those made in the more
informed state with information embodied in fro(P).
An Ex-Post Measure
An ex-post measure of the value of information is defined to be the
difference between profits earned in the perfect state, equation (11), when
the agent has perfect information and profits earned in the realized state,
equation (7). This value of information, denoted by VII, is given by
VIl=#-#= (Prqt - C(qt)] - [Prqo -C(q”)]. (12)
From the definition of the primal-dual problem, it follows that VII is always
non-negative.
The ex-post measure of the value of information is illustrated graphically
in Figure 1 for the case where the agent expects a higher output price than is
actually realized. The top graph in this figure separates the total cost and
total revenue components of the profit function. Although total cost is known
to the agent in the subjective state, total revenue is not. Hence, the solid


































known, while the dashed line, EOTR, is the total revenue as perceived by the
agent in the subjective state. From revenue, TR, and cost, TC, the profit
function with perfect information, rT, is shown in the lower graph where its
t maximum is given by Tt at q . Expected subjective profits (denoted by the
dashed curve in the lower graph) are based on TC and the expected total
revenue, EOTR. Because expected utility of profits is maximized in the
subjective state and the agent is assumed to be risk averse, the optimal output
in this state, q“, lies somewhere to the left of the maximum point of the
expected subjective profits curve. Although EOTO is the profit expected by
the agent in the subjective state, the realized profit is determined by the
true profit function. Hence, if q“ were produced, realized profits, rr, is
attained instead of EOTO. Since Tt lies at the maximum point of the true
profit curve, the realized profit, ITr,for any other output choice
will result in a lower value. Consistent with (12), the value of
VII, t is given by the difference between r and mr.
but qt
information,
The usefulness of this approach now becomes apparent. Even though
U(n) is generally not known, q“ and ITrare observable; and rt can be esti-
mated. In this case, if the establishment of a forward market is being
contemplated or if consideration is being given to a policy of announcing
the price of output at the time production decisions are made, our procedure
gives insights into output response and changes in profits in a rather
2/ straightforwardmanner.—
Ex-Ante Measures
In the case of VII, information is considered to be perfect because
decisions made in the subjective state are compared to those made when
actual output price is known at the time production commitments are made.-9-
When P is stochastic, it is impossible to measure the value of “perfect”
information ex-ante because output price cannot yet be observed. Recall
that the agent’s subjective distribution is formulated by using the infor-
mation available to him at the time the output decision was made. For our
purposes here the more informed distribution is defined as more descriptive of
the stochastic variable P than Che subjective distribution. Hence, the value
of information can be computed by determining what it would be worth to the
agent to know the more informed distribution rather than his subjective dis-
tribution. Two conceptualizationsof this problem will be discussed in this
section.
The first ex-ante measure discussed is based on expected utility in the
more informed and subjective states. This measure, denoted by V12, is
illustrated in Figure 2. Curve E’%(m) represents the agent’s expected
utility of profits in the more informed state. The optimal quantity to be
produced in the more informed state, qm, lies at the maximum point on the
E%(T) curve. Expected utility of profits at qm is denoted by E%(rm) on
the vertical axis. For the case depicted in figure 2, the agent’s expected
utility of profits in the subjective state, based on f“(p) and EOU(m), is
depicted by the broken curve. The maximization of EOU(T) yields the optimal
quantity, q“, produced in the subjective state with corresponding subjective
utility of EOU(mO). However, the expected utility of q“ in the more informed
state is E%(n”). Hence, the value of information can be defined to be the
difference in the more informed state between the expected utility of
producing qm and the expected utility of producing q“:




















~ qIt can be shown that V12 will always
dual equation (l). By derivation of
-u-
be non-negative by considering primal-
quantity qm, it is clear that qm =’q*
in equation (1) when expectations are taken with respect to fro(p). Ey
definition of the primal-dual problem, EU(m*) is the maximum value of expected
utility that can be attained over all possible values of profit. Thus‘,
L* = EU(m*) - EU(m) ~ O
= E%(T) > 0 E%(?rm) - -
and hence VI is non-negative. 2
This measure of the value of information, however, is not very useful
because utility has only ordinal properties. To avoid the problems created
by ordinal measures, a measure similar to equivalent variation in the certainty
case is derived.
For illustration purposes consider the simple case when fro(p)has only
two parameters a mean and variance. In Figure 3, the mean-variances (E, V)
space has been given for the more informed state where OAB is the mean-
variance frontier of response possibilities, and the L?’curves represent
isoutility where ~ > fi~> ~. Point A corresponds to the optimal output
level in the more informed state, qm, and the random variable profits, mm.
Let, decisions made in the subjective state lead to production q“. Then
the point corresponding to production level q“ must lie on or below the mean-
variance frontier OAB because this curve represents the set of all efficient
output levels in the more informed state. Suppose that output level c~”can be
represented by point C which by necessity, lies on slower isoutility






















Vq?rm) @(lT”) ~)an agent who produces q“ so that his
state would have been the same as if
-13-
expected utility in the more informed
he had produced qm. VI? is a value (as
d
opposed to utility) measure of the value of information. It is illustrated
by the distance on the vertical axis between points C and D.
Stated in general terms, define a nonstochasticvariable V13 such that
E%(mm) = E%(To + V13).S’ (14)
To show that VI, is non-negative, recall that U’(IT)> 0 implies
Since it
U(7Q ~ U(?T2) if ITl> lr2. (15)
has already been shown from the primal-dual problem that
E%(Tm) ~ E%(ITo), then by equation (14),
E%(n” +V13) ~ E%(mO).
By definition of expectations,
$U(r” +V13)fm(p)dp @~0)fm(p)dp.
But by the properties of integrals, expression (17) implies
U(To +V13) ~ U(n”).
Then by equation (15),
no -t- V13 > IT”.
And hence, V13 is non-negative.
While the practical application of this approach is more complex than
in the previous case, its advantage relative to other approaches lies in
the ease of obtaining a monetary measure of the value of having the additional
information embodied in fro(p). In this case, knowledge of the agent’s utility
function and fro(p) are required to compute the value of information. However,
knowledge of his initial beliefs f“(p) are not required. Estimates of fro(p)
may come about through public or private research to obtain insights into
factors determining the distribution of P. Given knowledge of the agent’s
(16)
(17)“l4-
utility function, our measure of the value of information becomes a key input




the knowledge embodied in fro(p). As in the previous cases, this
also useful because value is measured relative to realized outcome
in addition to estimates of the value of information, estimates
of changes in q and are also obtained.
III. Concluding Remarks
The theory of the competitive firm under price uncertainty has besn
addressed a number of times in the literature where the optimal output
decision for the agent is generally derived given his subjective distribution
of output price. Within this problem setting, less attention has been given
to deriving practical monetary measures of the value of information resulting
from a more accurate distribution of output price. In this paper, four states
of information were defined to address this problem. Measures of the value
of information were obtained using expected utilities and optimal output
decisions in the differentstates.
The usefulness of this approach is that, in the case of VII, the value
of information can be measured in monetary units from observed data without
knowledge of the agent’s utility function. In the case where a more accurate
distribution of output price can be made available to the agent, V13, a
monetary measure of the value of information is derived which requires know-
ledge of the agent’s utility function. However, unlike other approaches,
knowledge is not required of his beliefs about the posterior
agent behaves according to Bayes theorem. In each case, our
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Since the form of the utility function is assumed to be




risk the agent incurred in producing q“. See Appendix for discussion.
~i Lindley (1971) describes a similar measure for the value of in-
formation, Z, given by EBU(TB - Z) = EBU(no), where expectations are taken
with respect to the Bayesian posterior distribution fg(p). Although both
Lindley’s Z and our V13 are measures of the amount the agent is willing to
pay to obtain more information, they may not be equal; and there is a subtle
difference in interpretation. In the Bayesian approach Z is the amount of




same amount of utility in the more informed state as producing
our case, V1.3is the amount of money that must be given to the agent
produces q“ so that his expected utility in the more informed state
is the same as if he had produced qm. Whether other measures, such as the
distance A-E or the distance F-G provide equivalent measures to V13 depends
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APPENDIX: SAMPLE PROBLEM
Consider an expected utility function of the form:
(Al) EU(IT)= Em -auT,
where the risk parameter is a and UT is the standard error of profits. This
form has been justified on the basis of a second order taylor series expansion
or as a decision function of Freund’s negative exponential utility function
under normality.
For clarity, let T = P&- - plx where output price, P, isstochastic, x is
input and pl is input price. It fallows from the maximization of (Al) that
the indirect utility function is
EU(IT*) = p~l(~ - ao)2 .25
where the agent’s forecast of output price is described by P % N(;, a).
For the case of (Al), it haabeen shown by Pope (1978) that the optimal
quantity supplied is given by
(A.2) ~EU(r*)/3~= q*
is given by 3Eu(m*)/apl =
*
-whilethe optimum level of input use -x .
The first problem is to derive the value of perfect information given
knowledge of q“ and cost C(q),although,values (~, or, a, PI) are assigned
in order that the results may be confirmed using (Al) if desired. The
ex-ante value V13 is derived next where
While various procedures have been used
that only (A.2) has been fit to data is
also sufficient to derive C(q).
knowledge of (Al) is assumed.
to estimate (Al) the supposition
employed. This supposition is
To obtain the solution for the subjective state, the following initial
values are assumed: (;, u, Q, PI) = (33, 3.6, .8, 1.5). It can be verified
that these values yield the solution (EOU(TO), q“, C(qO), EO(ITO)) =
(151.2, 10.04, 151.2, 180.12), where “o” denotes the agent’s initial
distribution of output price f“(p).-18-
The ex-post measure of the value of perfect information, VII, is given
by (12). Let the price realized at the time output is marketed be denoted
by pr = 24. In this case,
(A.3) VII = prqt - C(qt) - [prqo - C(qt)]
= [24(8) - 96] - [24(10.04)- 151.2] = 6.24 “
The agent would be willing to pay or forfeit 6.24 to either know or be
guaranteed, at the time of making production commitments, the price pr.
The ex-ante value-measure, V13, is shown for the case where the more
informed distribution of output price fro(p)is described by P % N(24, 3.0).
Given the parameter c%from (A.2) it can be verified that these values
yield the solution (E~(ITm),qm, C(qm), Em(mm)) = (77.76, 7.2, 77.76, 95.04).
The right hand side of (14) is
E%(ITO + V13) = prnqo- C(qO) - uq”~m+ V13,
in which case
V13 = pmqm - C(qm) - m m
aq 0 - [Pmqo -C(qO) -aq”aml
= 77.76 - 65.66 = 12.01.
The value (12.01) is the maximum amount
to adopt the more informed distribution
the agent would be willing to pay
fro(p) .
Continuing with the supposition that only (A.2) has been fit to data,
it can be shown that the ex-post measure given in (A.3) can be considered
a lower bound to the value of perfect information for the risk averse agent
if the compensation the agent demanded for the risk involved in producing —
q“ is viewed as a cost and hence removed from realized profits Tr. Recall
from (7) that realized profits are rr = prqo - C(qO). In this case the-19-
estimate of the ex-post value of perfect information, given f“(p), increases.
In the context of this problem, total cost (c) becomes
2 c = q pl + aq”u = 151.2 -!- 28.92 = 180.12,
and
fil = prqt - C(qt) - [prqo - C(qO, aa)] = 96 - 60.84 = 35.16.